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1. Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 15
May 1916
I shall have the honour to reply fully in a further note
to your Excellency's note of the 9th instant, relative to the creation of
an Arab State, but I should meanwhile be grateful if your Excellency could
assure me that in those regions which, under the conditions recorded in
that communication, become entirely French, or in which French interests
are recognised as predominant, any existing British concessions, rights of
navigation or development, and the rights and privileges of any British
religious, scholastic, or medical institutions will be maintained.
His Majesty's Government are, of course, ready to give a
reciprocal assurance in regard to the British area.
2. Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, 16
May 1916
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your
Excellency's note of the 9th instant, stating that the French Government
accept the limits of a future Arab State, or Confederation of States, and
of those parts of Syria where French interests predominate, together with
certain conditions attached thereto, such as they result from recent
discussions in London and Petrograd on the subject.
I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply
that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve
the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's
Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies
entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in
Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided
that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil
the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.
Introduction
The Sykes Picot agreement,
concluded in 1916, divided the Middle East into areas of influence for
France, Great Britain and others, giving the French control over modern
Syria and Lebanon. Most of Palestine was to have been under international
control. Though the agreement mentions the possibility of cessions by
either side to an Arab state, it in fact made it impossible for Great
Britain to honor the promises made by Sir Henry McMahon to Sheriff Hussein
in 1915.
It is accordingly understood between the French
and British governments:
That France and Great Britain are prepared to
recognize and protect an independent Arab states or a confederation of
Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the
annexed
map, under the suzerainty of
an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain,
shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area
(a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or
foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of
Arab states.
That in the blue area France, and in the red area
Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect
administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to
arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.
That in the brown area there shall be established
an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon
after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the
other allies, and the representatives of the sheriff of Mecca.
That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of
Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the tigres
and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His majesty's government, on their
part, undertakes that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the
cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the
French government.
That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards
the trade of the British empire, and that there shall be no discrimination
in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British
goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through
Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, or (b) area, or area
(a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against
British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port
serving the areas mentioned.
That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the
trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no
discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping
and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods
through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether
those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or
area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect,
against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at
any port serving the areas mentioned.
That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be
extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond
Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates
valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two
governments.
That Great Britain has the right to build,
administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b),
and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at
all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is
to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is
further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense
entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the
project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to
consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polgon Banias
Keis Marib Salkhad tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b).
For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish
customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and
red areas, as well as in areas (a) and (b), and no increase in the rates
of duty or conversions from ad valorem to specific rates shall be
made except by agreement between the two powers.
There shall be no interior customs barriers
between any of the above mentioned areas. The customs duties livable on
goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry
and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.
It shall be agreed that the French government
will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their
rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power,
except the Arab state or confederation of Arab states, without the
previous agreement of His Majesty's government, who, on their part, will
give a similar undertaking to the French government regarding the red
area.
The British and French government, as the
protectors of the Arab state, shall agree that they will not themselves
acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial
possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third power
installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of
the red sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden
frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.
The negotiations with the Arabs as to the
boundaries of the Arab states shall be continued through the same channel
as heretofore on behalf of the two powers.
It is agreed that measures to control the
importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the
two governments.
I have further the honor to state that, in order
to make the agreement complete, His Majesty's government are proposing to
the Russian government to exchange notes analogous to those exchanged by
the latter and your Excellency’s government on the 26th April last. Copies
of these notes will be communicated to your Excellency as soon as
exchanged. I would also venture to remind your Excellency that the
conclusion of the present agreement raises, for practical consideration,
the question of claims of Italy to a share in any partition or
rearrangement of Turkey in Asia, as formulated in Article 9 of the
agreement of the 26th April, 1915, between Italy and the allies.
His Majesty's government further considers that
the Japanese government should be informed of the arrangements now
concluded.
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